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ABSTRACT
This research examines the organizational performance 
implications of relative wage strategies and pay 
structures. Organizations' relative wage strategies and pay 
structures are key characteristics useful in describing and 
delimiting various compensation systems, and are therefore 
particularly relevant for evaluation at the organizational 
level. The organizational performance implications of 
organizations' relative wage strategies and pay structures 
are investigated in terms of both operational and financial 
indicators of organizational performance. Initially, 
relevant theory and past research on relative wage 
strategies and pay structures are discussed. Following 
this, hypotheses are developed that predict the operational 
and financial performance implications of pay structures 
and relative wage rates. Next, the sample and research 
methodology used to investigate the research hypotheses are 
presented. Results indicate that relative wage practices 
and pay structures influence measures of organizational 
performance. Moreover, results also show that relative wage 
practice and pay structures interact to influence the 
operational and financial measures of organizational 
performance. The research concludes with a discussion of
i x
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the results, their limitations, and suggestions for future 
research.
x
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CHAPTER ONE: THE DISSERTATION TOPIC
Research investigating the strategic implications of 
human resource management (HRM) practices has found that 
firms' HRM practices have significant implications for 
organizational performance (Arthur, 1992; Arthur, 1994; 
Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Becker & Huselid, 1988; Huselid, 
1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994; Terpestra & Rozell, 
1993; Wright, McMahan & McWilliams, 1994; Wright & McMahan, 
1992). This research includes evidence of HRM's effects on 
both operational indicators of organizational performance 
(e.g., scrap rates, product quality, productivity)(Cutcher- 
Gershenfeld, 1991; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Youndt, 
Snell, Dean & Lepak; 1996) and financial measures of 
performance (e.g. profit, return on assets)(Becker & 
Huselid, 1998; Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991; Delery & Doty, 
1996; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Welbourne & Andrews, 
1996). Of particular note, compensation systems have been 
shown to play a major role in human resource practices' 
affects on organizational level results (Becker & Huselid,
1998). Becker and Huselid (1996) found that an increase in 
managers 1 monetary compensation by one standard deviation 
is associated with 19% higher market values and 27% higher 
accounting profits. Research has also found that the use of 
performance-based contingent compensation practices, such
1
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as bonuses, are associated with organizations' financial 
performance (e.g. Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). Similarly, 
incentive based compensation practices, such as those that 
focus on service quality, have been shown to relate to 
operational performance (e.g. Banker, Lee, Potter & 
Srinivasan, 1996).
A sufficient body of research on compensation 
practices has thus emerged, illustrating the sizable role 
that compensation systems play in determining 
organizational performance (e.g., Becker & Gerhart, 1996); 
however, the body of research investigating compensation 
practices' influence on organizational performance is 
relatively new. Furthermore, considering the importance and 
complexities of compensation issues, more research on the 
organizational performance implications of such practices 
is still needed (Becker & Gerhart, 1996). In particular, 
research addressing the organizational performance 
implications of specific compensation practices is 
pertinent (Becker & Huselid, 1998; Gerhart & Milkovich, 
1990; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; Gerhart, Trevor & Graham, 
1996). This research will address the impact of 
organizational level compensation practices on 
organizational performance. Specifically, it will address 
the question: How do compensation practices affect
2
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operational and financial indicators of organizational 
performance?
Compensation Research 
While there has been substantial micro level 
compensation research investigating compensation practices' 
relationship with a host of individual level issues 
including employees' attraction, retention, turnover, 
absenteeism, participation in union activities, and 
individual job performance (e.g., Ehrenberg & Smith, 1988; 
Heneman, 1985; Milkovich & Newman, 1990; Rynes & Barber, 
1990) there is only limited research considering 
compensation practices' impact on organizational level 
(i.e., macro) variables (Gerhart et al., 1996; Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1990; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992) . Notable 
exceptions include research investigating the impact of 
several compensation practices' on organizations' staffing 
levels (e.g., Lineneman, Wachter, & Carter, 1990), return 
on investments (e.g., Raff & Summers, 1987), and 
performance (e.g., Banker et al., 1996). However, only 
limited individual, and little simultaneous attention 
(i.e., multiple practices investigated at the same time) 
has been given to the performance implications of key 
aspects of compensation systems such as their relative wage 
levels and pay structures (Bloom & Milkovich, 1996; Bloom &
3
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Milkovich, 1998; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1992; Milkovich & Newman, 1999) . This gap in 
macro compensation research is noteworthy because these 
compensation practices are critical to developing, 
implementing, and maintaining a compensation plan. They are 
thus likely to affect important organizational outcomes, 
and are inexorably linked to organizations' successes or 
failures (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; Milkovich & Newman, 
1999). Furthermore, because relative wage levels and pay 
structures are readily comparable across organizations, and 
are useful in describing and delimiting various 
compensation systems, they are particularly relevant for 
evaluation at the organizational level (Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1992; Milkovich & Newman, 1999). Thus, this 
research will consider the effects of both pay structures 
and relative wage levels at the organizational level.
Pav Level. Pay Structures, and Relevant Theory 
Relative wage level represents a firm's average 
compensation level relative to the wages paid by other 
competing organizations (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). 
Relative wage rates are often expressed as either leading, 
matching, or lagging the market (Milkovich & Newman, 1999) . 
Pay structures describe the array of pay rates within 
organizations. Defining characteristics of particular pay
4
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structures include the number of levels in the structure, 
the size of the pay differentials between each level in the 
structure, and the rate that employees may progress through 
each level in the structure (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992).
Pay structures can be described as the degree to which 
organizations' compensation systems are either egalitarian 
or hierarchical. Compensation systems are more egalitarian 
(i.e. less hierarchical) to the extent that their pay 
structures have fewer levels and compressed pay 
distributions (Bloom, 1999; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). In 
hierarchical structures, pay distributions have more levels 
over which pay is more widely dispersed (Bloom, 1999) .
While many theoretical perspectives can be employed in 
investigating the performance implications of relative wage 
strategies (e.g., compensating differentials theory, 
efficiency wage theory, signaling theory, reservation wage 
theory, job competition theory) and pay structures (e.g., 
expectancy theory, human capital theory, equity theory, 
tournament theory), efficiency wage theory and equity 
theory have been most widely applied to gain insights into 
their strategic implications in organizational settings 
(Becker, 1975; Bloom & Milkovich, 1996; Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1992; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1996; Klaas & 
McClendon, 1996; Krefting, 1980; Krefting & Mahoney, 1977;
5
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Lawler, 1990; Lawler, 1994; Milkovich & Newman, 1999; 
O'Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1993; Tsang, 1987).
Efficiency wage theory suggests several mechanisms 
whereby relative wage strategies may influence employee 
performance, and therefore, organizational performance 
(Akerlof & Yellen, 1986; Boudreau & Berger, 1985; Klaas & 
McClendon, 1996). Conversely, equity theory is helpful in 
explaining why organizational performance may either 
increase or decrease as pay structures become more or less 
hierarchical (Bloom, 1999; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; 
Eriksson, 1999; Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Main et al., 1993; 
Vroom, 1964). In this research, I will use these approache 
to investigate relative wage strategies and pay structures 
implications for organizations' performance.
Significance of the Dissertation
Authors of theoretical research agree that both 
relative wage rates and pay structures are important; 
however, empirical research has largely been absent on the 
performance implications of various relative wage 
strategies and pay structures either singularly or in 
unison (Bloom, 1999; Klaas & McClendon, 1996).
Accordingly, the focus of this research will be on the 
implications for operational and financial indicators of 
organizational performance. Operational and financial
6
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indicators are being used because a complete understanding 
of relative wage strategies and pay structures' effects on 
organizational performance requires a consideration of 
their impact in these areas (Boudreau & Berger, 1985; 
Boudreau, Sturman, Trevor, & Gerhart, 1999; Klaas & 
McClendon, 1996; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).
From a research perspective, this study should be 
useful in understanding the organizational performance 
effects of organizational level compensation practices.
This is consistent with the increased interest in the 
research literature in understanding the strategic 
implications of HRM practices (Becker & Gerhart, 1996). 
Practically, these are important areas for research because 
organizations ultimately choose pay structures and relative 
wage rates to influence organizational success (Bloom,
1999) . In this respect, increased knowledge of relative 
wage rates and pay structures is particularly important in 
an era in which organizational responses to heightened 
competitive pressures frequently include pay level and pay 
structure policy changes (Bloom & Milkovich, 1996; Gerhart 
& Milkovich, 1992; Klaas & McClendon, 1996, Lawler, 1990; 
Lawler, 1994; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993).
7
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Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter two 
presents the relevant theory and literature that serve as a 
basis for the dissertation. It also presents the hypotheses 
to be investigated in the dissertation. Chapter three 
presents the dissertation's methods. This includes a 
discussion of the dissertation's sample, its measures, 
control variables, and the proposed analytical technique. 
Results will be presented in chapter four. Chapter five 
discusses the dissertation's results, its limitations, and 
directions for future research.
8
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Relative Wage Practices
Effects of Relative Wage Strategies on Operational 
Indicators of Organizational Performance
Employee efficiency is the primary mechanism through 
which relative wage practices influence operational 
measures of organizational performance (e.g., productivity 
in units per labor hour) (Akerlof & Yellen, 1986; Kim,
1998; Rebitzer & Taylor, 1995). How these effects may 
manifest themselves can be understood by examining 
predictions from efficiency wage theory.
According to efficiency wage theory, high relative 
wages improve employee and organizational efficiency 
because firms that offer high relative wages can attract 
and retain highly qualified job candidates (Akerlof & 
Yellen, 1984; Campbell, 1993; Yellen, 1984; Weiss, 1988). 
High relative wages also generate large applicant pools 
which allow organizations to be more selective when hiring 
(Boudreau, 1992; Boudreau & Rynes,1985; Raff & Summers, 
1987; Williams & Dreher, 1992). Because organizations are 
more able to hire the most capable employees, those that 
pay high relative wages experience increases in both 
employee and organizational efficiency. Therefore, the 
ability to attract and retain better employees due to high 
relative wages will positively influence operational
9
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indicators of organizational performance (Becker & Huselid, 
1998; Boudreau & Rynes, 1985; Campbell, 1993; Hunter & 
Hunter, 1984; Williams & Dreher, 1992). Illustrating this, 
Raff and Summers (1987) have included this perspective as 
one explanation for Henry Ford's 1914 decision to pay 
employees above market wages. Specifically, even though 
Raff and Summers (1987) discount this perspective's 
applicability to the situation at Ford, they do note its 
effectiveness in increasing Ford's employee attraction and 
retention.
Efficiency wage theory also suggests that high 
relative wages improve employee and organizational 
efficiency by decreasing employees’ unproductive or 
shirking behavior (Akerlof & Yellen, 1984). These effects 
may be particularly important when employees' job 
performance is costly and/or difficult to monitor (Capelli 
& Chauvin, 1991; Rebitzer & Taylor, 1995; Walsh, 1999). 
Indeed, when relative wages are high, employees who shirk 
will suffer personal economic costs from involuntary 
turnover (Akerlof & Yellen, 1984). Personal costs result 
because employees who are fired may have a di fficult time 
finding other jobs with similarly high wages (Akerlof & 
Yellen, 1984; Capelli & Chauvin, 1991). Illustrating this, 
Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) found low levels of shirking
10
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and shirking related disciplinary problems when wage rates 
were high.
Although not considered part of efficiency wage 
theory, Lazear (1979) has used a similar explanation to 
demonstrate why employees might be compensated lower than 
their marginal productivity (i.e., the value of their 
organizational contributions) early in their careers and 
higher than their marginal productivity later in their 
careers. Delayed compensation, as this is called, is 
attributed to the positive employee agency effects (i.e., 
employees acting in the best interest of their 
organizations) associated with these increasing wage 
profiles. The prospects of higher wages (i.e., efficiency 
wages) keep employees motivated and focused on tasks at 
hand and discourage unproductive activities. Prospective 
future higher wages are motivational because employees 
realize that current poor performance will eliminate their 
opportunities to receive higher wages in the future.
Norm-gift exchange models provide another efficiency 
wage theory based explanation for relative wage practices' 
effects on employee and organizational efficiency (Akerlof 
1982; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). Norm-gift exchange model 
assert that, as a consequence of employee-firm exchanges, 
employees acquire sentiments for their firms and feel
11
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obliged to maintain equity in these exchanges (Akerlof, 
1982; Cropanzano & Greenberg,1997; Gerhart & Milkovich, 
1992; Yellen, 1984). Therefore, when inequity occurs in 
these exchanges, employees seek to return the relationship 
to a state of equity (Adams, 1963; Akerlof, 1982;
Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Festinger, 1954; Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1992; Yellen, 1984). Accordingly, one 
explanation for high relative wages' positive influence is 
that they create a disequilibrium in the employee-firm 
relationship resulting in increases in employee effort and 
efficiency (Adams, 1963; Akerlof, 1982; Cropanzano & 
Greenberg, 1998; Festinger, 1954; Gerhart & Milkovich,
1992; Akerlof, 1984). Yellen (1984), describes this as 
firms paying "workers a gift of wages in excess of the 
minimum required, in return for their (workers) gift of 
effort above the minimum required." (p.204)
To summarize, each of these explanations based on 
efficiency wage theory suggests that high relative wages 
will positively contribute to increased employee and 
organizational efficiency.
Hypothesis 1. Organizations' relative wage levels will 
be positively related to operational indicators of 
organizational performance.
12
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Effects of Relative Wage Strategies on Financial Indicators
of Organizational Performance
The effects of relative wage strategies on financial 
indicators of organizational performance are more complex 
than their effects on operational indicators of 
organizational performance. Financial indicators of 
organizational performance, such as return on assets (ROA) 
or profit margin, reflect organizations' fulfillment of 
their economic goals, and focus on both the efficiency 
benefits and costs of relative wage strategies (Venkatraman 
& Ramanujam, 1996). Costs of relative wage strategies 
primarily reflect the pay associated with pursuing a 
particular relative wage strategy. Costs of relative wage 
strategies vary because the pay associated with each 
strategy varies. Importantly, the efficiency benefits of 
relative wage strategies also vary. Thus, depending upon 
the specific circumstances, more costly relative wage 
strategies may yield efficiency benefits which either 
exceed or fall short of their costs. Moreover, the effects 
of relative wage strategies on financial indicators of 
performance depend upon the difference between the 
strategies' costs and their efficiency benefits (Walsh,
1999) .
Considered from the perspective of financial 
indicators of performance, optimal relative wage strategies
13
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are those which maximize the differential between their 
costs and benefits. As relative wage strategies move from 
lagging to leading market wages, both their costs and 
efficiency benefits increase. Initially, efficiency wage 
theory would suggest that greater relative wage levels' 
efficiency benefits outweigh their associated costs. Thus, 
financial indicators of organizational performance are 
positively influenced. However, there are likely to be 
limits on potential efficiency gains, such as those due to 
limits in individual ability, the circumstances of work 
(e.g., equipment limitation), and/or the opportunity to 
perform (Blumberg & Pringle, 1982; Peters & O'Connor,
1980). Therefore, at some point, the efficiency benefits of 
higher relative wages likely cease to outweigh their costs 
and financial indicators of organizational performance are 
adversely influenced. This suggests the following 
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. An inverted U-shaped relation exists 
between organizational level relative wage strategies 
and financial indicators of organizational 
performance.
Pay Structures 
In addition to relative wage practices, pay structures 
may also influence organizations' performance (Bloom, 1999;
14
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Bloom & Michael, in press). Pay structures' effects on 
organizational performance have received less attention 
than relative wage practices. One explanation for this is 
that pay structures present researchers with what at first 
appears to be a paradoxical situation in that prior 
research provides very dissimilar descriptive statements 
regarding pay structures1 impact on individual and 
organizational performance (Bloom, 1999). Specifically, 
some suggest positive consequences as pay structures become 
more hierarchical (e.g Becker & Huselid, 1992; Ehrenberg & 
Bognanno, 1990; Eriksson, 1999; Knoeber & Thurman, 1994; 
Krefting & Mahoney, 1977; Krefting, 1980; Lazear & Rosen, 
1981; Main et ai., 1993), while others suggest negative 
consequences as pay structures become more hierarchical 
(e.g., Bloom, 1999; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). In short, 
research has suggested that both hierarchical and 
egalitarian pay structures are useful. To clarify these 
seemingly inconsistent perspectives, hypotheses are 
proposed to explain how hierarchical and egalitarian pay 
structures impact performance.
Hierarchical Pav Structures
Tournament theory has been widely used to explain the 
positive effects of hierarchical pay structures (Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1992; Milkovich & Newman, 1999). According to
15
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tournament theory, pay structures have motivational 
characteristics consistent with their degree of pay 
dispersion (Eriksson, 1999; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). 
Specifically, as pay dispersion increases, employees become 
more competitive and therefore more motivated to 
demonstrate those behaviors that move them from their 
current to the next pay level (Becker & Huselid, 1992; 
Bloom, 1999, Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990; Eriksson, 1999; 
Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Milkovich & Newman, 1999) . Thus, 
hierarchical pay structures positively affect individual 
and organizational performance.
Because tournament theory has been widely used to 
explain pay structures positive effects, pay structures 
have mostly been investigated in tournament like athletic 
settings. These settings have been employed because they 
conceptually resemble tournaments as proposed in tournament 
theory. Prior research has found support for hierarchical 
pay structures in these settings. For instance, Ehrenberg 
and Bognanno (1990) investigated golfers' individual 
performance based upon overall prize levels in golf 
tournaments. Since tournaments' prize structures are 
frequently similar, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) 
hypothesized that golfers' performance should be related to 
overall prize levels because greater prize money should
16
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lead to proportionate increases in prize differentials 
(Knoeber & Thurman, 1994). Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) 
found that as prize levels increased, golfers' performance, 
on average, also increased. Similarly, building on the work 
of Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990), Becker and Huselid (1992) 
investigated performance among automobile race car drivers. 
In this study, Becker and Huselid (1992) focused on the 
incentive effects of prize differentials associated with 
various race finishing positions. Becker and Huselid 
(1992)found that these prize differentials have incentive 
effects on both individual performance and driver safety 
practices (e.g., wreck less or careless driving habits). 
Moreover, incentive effects were found to peak as prize 
differentials became greater.
While positive results such as those of Ehrenberg and 
Bognano (1990) and Becker and Huselid (1992) provide 
compelling support for hierarchical pay structures, their 
findings must be cautiously interpreted. Specifically, 
while tournament theory is useful in investigating pay 
structures in tournament-like settings, application of the 
theory to organizational settings may be questionable 
because few organizational settings resemble tournament 
environments (O'Reilly et al., 1988). Moreover, because 
these studies were performed in athletic settings, their
17
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generalizability to organizational settings is further 
limited (Bloom & Milkovich, 1996; Gerhart & Milkovich,
1992; Knoeber & Thurman, 1994).
Tournament theory suggests a hierarchical system, but 
it assumes that people can all compete for higher 
positions. However, in business settings, not every 
employee is qualified to compete for positions higher up in 
the organization. Thus, although there are a number of 
notable limitations to tournament theory, it is this 
assumption of movement that is most limiting in 
organizational settings. Therefore, perspectives on pay 
structures that specifically address the idea of individual 
qualifications may be more applicable. Moreover, notions 
that,(a) people in jobs requiring greater skill should 
receive greater pay, and that (b) greater skills are 
required at higher organizational levels, seem particularly 
supportive of the use of hierarchical pay structures.
Higher earnings should accrue to those who improve 
their productivity by investing in themselves through 
greater education, training, and experience (Becker, 1975; 
Milkovich & Newman, 1999). The value of an individual's 
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) is a function of the 
time spent developing them (Becker, 1975; Milkovich & 
Newman, 1999). Moreover, the skills and time necessary to
18
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gain certain skills restrict individuals' entry into 
various occupations (Becker, 1975; Milkovich & Newman,
1999). Thus, people in jobs that require long expensive 
training should be paid more than people in jobs that 
require less extensive preparation (Milkovich & Newman,
1999).
Different levels of knowledge are required to perform 
essential job tasks throughout an organization (Becker, 
1975; Milkovich & Newman, 1999). Specifically, greater KSAs 
are necessary for effective performance in higher level 
positions due to these positions greater sophistication, 
complexity, and consequence for organizational performance 
(Becker, 1975; Milkovich & Newman, 1999).
Based on the above ideas, organizations with 
hierarchical pay structures benefit because employees with 
greater KSAs prefer these organizations. Moreover, 
employees with high KSAs prefer these organizations because 
they pay comparatively more compensation at higher 
organizational levels where employees need greater KSAs,.
In short, hierarchical pay structures are useful in both 
recruiting and retaining employees with high KSAs to these 
organizations (Livernash, 1957). Thus, in organizations 
where significant skill difference requirements exist 
between jobs or occupations, hierarchical pay systems will
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yield positive results. However, unlike tournament theory, 
this explanation for hierarchical pay structures positive 
effects does not rely on the assumption that those at 
different levels throughout the organization can all 
compete for prize jobs that are associated with higher 
levels of compensation.
Egalitarian Pay Structures
In contrast to the positive implications of 
hierarchical pay structures, equity theory suggests 
potentially dysfunctional consequences of hierarchical pay 
structures, and proposes positive consequences as a result 
of a more egalitarian pay structures. Specifically, equity 
theory suggests that as pay structures become more 
hierarchical, (i.e., less egalitarian), organizational 
performance will be adversely influenced because employees 
will become both less cooperative and less inclined towards 
teamwork (Bloom, 1999; Main et al., 1993).
An important characteristic of exchange processes is 
that their consequences have the possibility of being 
perceived as just or unjust (Adams, 1965). Employees 
evaluate equity in exchange relationships based upon 
comparisons of their inputs and outputs to those of others 
involved in similar relationships (Adams, 1965) . When 
employees perceive inequity, they may respond with a host
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of potentially negative reactions. Negative reactions 
represent a means of restoring equity in the exchange 
relationship. Specific negative responses to hierarchical 
pay distributions may include decreases in employee 
coordination and cooperation which may adversely influence 
organizational performance (Adams, 1965; Bloom, 1999; 
Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). Illustrating this, Pfeffer and 
Langton (1994), in a study of university faculty, found 
less research collaboration in academic departments where 
wage dispersion was greater. Indeed, hierarchical pay 
structures, when seen as unfair by employees, may create a 
"trust gap" (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992) . Under these 
circumstances, employees may become so disenchanted with 
pay differentials that they cease to trust the direction 
and guidance of employees at higher organizational levels. 
Negative consequences may be further exacerbated if 
compensation becomes a means of signaling organizational 
value (Bloom, 1999; Folger, 1993). In these cases, more 
hierarchical structures may create employee feelings of 
social and psychological, as well as economic injustice 
(Bloom, 1999; Deutsch, 1985; Folger, 1993). Thus, from an 
equity theory perspective, egalitarian pay structures seem 
preferable to hierarchical pay structures.
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Bloom (1999) found support for the effectiveness of 
egalitarian pay structures. Moreover, Bloom (1999), 
supported the precepts of equity theory. Using baseball 
teams, Bloom (1999) found that team performance was 
negatively related to the degree of hierarchy in teams' pay 
structures. Bloom (1999) suggested that, as baseball is a 
team game where success is dependent upon effective team 
performance, more hierarchical pay distributions may 
decrease employees' cooperativeness, and therefore their 
teamwork. While Bloom (1999) shares the generalizability 
limitations of the earlier athletic based studies, it does 
provide a compelling explanation for the use of egalitarian 
pay structures.
A Hypothesized Curvilinear Relation between Pay 
Distributions' Degree of Hierarchy and Organizational 
Performance
Bloom's (1999) finding of a negative linear 
relationship between pay distributions' degree of hierarchy 
and organizational performance does not forgo the 
possibility that the actual relation may be curvilinear. 
Equity theory, as mentioned earlier, is based on inputs and 
outputs. Thus, variance among employees' KSAs represent 
different inputs which, according to equity theory, does 
not imply a purely egalitarian system is most preferred. 
Rather, just as a purely hierarchical system may be
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perceived as unjust by some employees, a purely egalitarian 
system may be perceived as unjust by others.
A curvilinear relation between the degree of hierarchy 
in pay distributions and organizational performance is thus 
appropriate based upon the positive and negative 
consequences of egalitarian and hierarchical pay 
distributions. Moreover, the curvilinear relation arguably 
occurs because egalitarian pay structures are ineffective 
in recruiting and retaining employees with high KSAs while 
hierarchical pay distributions are problematic because they 
generate employee equity concerns and hinder employees' 
cooperation (Bloom, 1999; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992;
Pfeffer & Langton, 1994). Taken together, these extremes of 
pay dispersion (i.e. highly egalitarian and highly 
hierarchical) suggest an optimal level of pay dispersion is 
somewhere between these two extremes. Therefore, these 
conclusions lead to the following hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between pay structures and organizational 
performance:
Hypothesis 3. An inverted U shaped relation exists 
between pay structures' level of dispersion and 
operational indicators of organizational performance.
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Hypothesis 4. An inverted U shaped relation exists
between pay structures' level of dispersion and
financial indicators of organizational performance.
A Hypothesized Interaction between Pav Distributions'
Degree of Hierarchy and Relative Wage Levels
An argument for an interactive relation between
relative wage strategies and pay dispersion has recently
been presented in the compensation literature (i.e. Bloom
and Michael, in press). So far, this dissertation has
examined the implications of relative wage practices and
pay distributions independently. Indeed, the prior review
suggests that a substantial body of literature is relevant
for such a discussion, and that a gap exists in this area
of compensation research. However, as relative wage levels
and pay distributions are characteristics of any single pay
plan, it may also be important to consider how these
components may influence the effects of each other. Thus, I
now turn to consider the potential interaction between
these characteristics.
Frank's (1985) work on employees relative standing is
useful in illustrating a potential interaction between
relative wage levels and pay distributions. Frank (1985)
suggests workers may accept perceived inequality when they
are paid above their marginal products. Thus, when pay
structures are hierarchical, high relative wages may negate
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lower level employees' feelings of inequity. Similarly, 
when pay structures are egalitarian, high relative wages 
may lessen the negative impact of low pay dispersion on 
employees with high KSAs. However, although the effect of 
high relative wages on the performance effects of 
egalitarian and hierarchical pay structures will likely be 
positive, there is reason to expect that the impact of high 
relative wages will be greater when pay structures are 
hierarchical than when they are egalitarian. Employee 
performance at high organizational levels, or in more 
complex (and hence higher paid) jobs, is of greater
organizational consequence than employee performance at low
organizational levels (i.e., Boudreau et al., 1999; Hunter 
& Schmidt, 1983; Hunter Schmidt, & Judiesch, 1990). When 
pay is too egalitarian it is these employees who will hold 
feelings of inequity. Leading the market, on average for 
the organization as a whole, is unlikely to have a notable 
effect on the pay level of these high KSA/importance
employees. In other words, leading on average by 10% will
probably still lead to top employees being paid under 
market in an egalitarian system. On the other hand, when 
pay is hierarchical, leading the market may indicate that 
the organization values these high KSA/importance employees
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because, under these circumstances, these employees will be 
paid above market wages.
Hypothesis 5. The positive effects of relative wage 
strategies on operational indicators of organizational 
performance will be generated under a hierarchical pay 
structure rather than an egalitarian pay structure 
Hypothesis 6. The positive effects of relative wage 
strategies on financial indicators of organizational 
performance will be generated under a hierarchical pay 
structure rather than an egalitarian pay structure
26
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Sample
The sample for this dissertation is 394 short term 
stay acute care general hospitals in the state of 
California. Hospitals present a valuable opportunity for 
studying the organizational performance effects of 
compensation practices since over 50 percent of their 
expenditures are devoted to salaries and benefits (American 
Hospital Association, 1993; Langland-Orban, Gapenski, & 
Vogel, 1996). Short-term stay hospitals are defined as 
those facilities with average lengths of stay less than 
thirty days (OSHPD, 1991). Acute care general hospitals are 
those hospitals that provide a comprehensive range of 
services as opposed to those hospitals which provide only 
specialized services such as psychiatric care (MacEachern, 
1957). Only short-term acute care hospitals are examined so 
that the results are not confounded by the different types 
of services or clients associated with different hospital 
types.
Data is drawn from state mandated (i.e., Chapter 1326, 
California statuses of 1984) annual hospital disclosure 
reports provided by hospitals to the California Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). Through 
a system of uniform accounting and reporting procedures,
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California hospitals are required to annually provide 
financial disclosure reports to the OSHPD. Hospitals must 
provide the reports no later than four months after the end 
of their fiscal year. These reports enable the public, 
third-party payers, and other interested parties to study 
and analyze the financial aspects of hospitals in 
California (OSHPD, 1991). Annual reports from 1991 to 1996 
are used in this dissertation.
Although all hospitals in the sample provide the same 
types of services, they still vary along several 
characteristics. These include size, ownership, and profit 
(versus not for profit) status. As is the norm in the 
health care field, hospital size is measured using bed 
count based measures (Goes & Parker, 1997). Size is 
presented in terms of staffed beds (Leiyu, 1996).
Ownership considers whether a hospital is privately or 
publicly owned. Profit status considers whether the 
hospital is a for profit or not for profit venture. Table 
1 lists summary statistics of hospitals in the sample.
Data has been provided by the OSHPD in a CD format. 
Supporting documentation used in analyzing the data 
included both hard copy and computer generated data guides. 
Published research has used these data to investigate 
hospital employment trends (e.g., Anderson & Kohn, 1996),
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Table 1 
Sample Summary Statistics
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 All Years
Number Efi Number EerceaL Number Percent Number Percent Number PfiXCfiat Number Percent Number Percent
Number of Hospitals 354 345 333 336 319 339 2026
Not for Profit 253 71.47% 250 72.46% 236 70.87% 243 72.32% 236 73.98% 233 68.73% 1451 71.62%
For Profit 101 28.53% 95 27.54% 97 29.13% 93 27.68% 83 26.02% 106 31.27% 575 28.38%
Privately Owned 292 82.49% 285 82.61% 286 85.89% 283 84.23% 264 62.76% 268 84 . 96% 1698 83.81%
Publicly Owned 62 17.51% 60 17.39% 47 14 .11% 53 15.77% 55 17.24% 51 15.04% 328 16.19%
Average Bed Size 192 182 169 176 175 174 178
vertical integration strategies (e.g., Cody, 1996), and the 
relationship between interorganizatioanl links and 
innovation (e.g., Goes & Park, 1997). This dissertation 
represents the first use of these data in the field of 
human resource management, and the first to specifically 
examine the pay practices of the hospitals.
Independent Measures 
Relative Wage Strategy
Relative wage strategy considers the level of an 
organization's average wage relative to the average wages 
of other organizations. Organizations that lead the market 
pay their employees more than the average wage of other 
organizations. Organizations which match the market pay 
their employees the average wage of other organizations. 
Organizations that lag the market pay their employees less 
than the average wage of other organizations. In this 
research, organizations' average wages are being determined 
using a weighted average of average wages for job 
categories through out the hospitals. The data set has job 
categories for physicians, nonphysician medical 
practitioners, managers and supervisors, technicians and 
specialist, registered nurses, licensed vocational nurses, 
aides and orderlies, clerical and other administrative 
staff, and environmental and food service staff. Weights
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are assigned to each job category based upon the total 
number of hours worked by employees in that category. 
Relative wage levels are calculated by dividing each 
organization's average wage by the average wage of all 
other organizations. Degree of either lead or lag of 
average market wages is calculated by subtracting 1 from 
this value. The resulting value represents each 
organization's percentage of either lead or lag of the 
average market wage. Negative values indicate that the 
organization lags the market. A zero value indicates that 
the organization matches the market. Positive values 
indicate that the organization leads the market.
Pay Dispersion
Gini coefficients are used to capture pay dispersion. 
Gini coefficients are widely used in the economics 
literature to calculate indices of national income 
inequality (Atkinson, 1969; Chakravarty, 1985; Donald & 
Weymark, 1980). Recently, management researchers have both 
suggested (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992) and employed 
(e.g., Bloom, 1999) gini coefficients in investigating pay 
dispersion.
Gini coefficients may be calculated using individual 
or subpopulation level data (Dagum, 1997). When calculated 
using subpopulation level data, gini coefficients represent
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a measure of inequality between groups (Dagum, 1997). In 
this research, I will follow the subpopulation approach to 
calculating gini coefficients and use average wage values 
at the job category level to determine gini coefficients. 
Calculated in this manner, the gini coefficients reflect 
the average difference between all possible pairs of job 
category average wage values expressed as a percent of the 
sum of the job category average wage values (Cowell, 1995) . 
The gini coefficients represent a measure of dispersion in 
the organizations' pay structures because the job 
categories used in calculating the gini coefficients 
represent categories of employees at different 
organizational levels. This facet of the gini coefficients 
is fundamental to the dissertation because pay dispersion 
between employees at unequal organizational levels is 
pivotal to how pay structures influence employee and 
therefore organizational performance.
Gini coefficients are calculated based upon a 
procedure presented by Cowell (1995):
Gini coefficient =(2/n2(mean y) ) [y(1|+2y[2] + 3y[3I + . . . +ny(nl ] -
((n+1)/n)
where yti] ....  y[n] are the average wages of each
organization's job categories arranged in increasing order 
of size, (mean y) is the mean of the average wages for each
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organization's job categories, and n is the number of job 
categories in each organization (Bloom, 1999; Cowell,
1995). Job categories used in calculating gini coefficients 
are the same as those used to calculate relative wage 
levels. The maximum gini coefficient value of 1 represents 
(hypothetically) the greatest degree of pay dispersion or 
absolute inequality in the pay distribution (Bloom, 1999). 
An example of this would be an organization where the 
managers receive all of the compensation and other 
employees receive no compensation. The minimum value of 
zero represents the lowest degree of pay dispersion or 
total equality in the pay distribution (Bloom, 1999). An 
example of this would be an organization where all jobs 
receive the same level of compensation. The higher an 
organization's gini coefficient the more hierarchical their 
pay distribution (Bloom, 1999).
Dependent Measures 
Previous strategic HRM research has observed that one 
challenge in this area is accurately defining and assessing 
firm performance measures when they are the dependent 
variables of interest (Rogers & Wright, 1999). Moreover, 
firm performance is a concept with a substantial number of 
possible indicators (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 198 6) . 
Important in the selection of firm performance measures in
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HRM research is recognition that HR interventions are 
primarily designed to influence HR outcomes, and that their 
influence on higher level outcomes will diminish relative 
to other factors which are more proximal to these higher 
level outcomes (Rogers & Wright, 1999) . Therefore, when 
selecting organizational performance measures it is 
imperative that the rationale for the particular measures 
be carefully considered.
Average Length of Stay
In this research, I have chosen to evaluate the impact 
of relative wage practices and pay structures on 
operational and financial indicators of organizational 
performance. Since relative wage strategies and pay 
structures are expected to influence organizational 
efficiency through their effects on employee efficiency, 
hospital's average length of stay has been selected as an 
operational indicator of organizational performance because 
it represents hospitals' efficiency of patient treatment 
(Sear, 1992; Thomas, 1997).
Average length of stay (ALOS) is the average length, 
measured in days, patients stay in a particular hospital. 
Average length of stay has been used as a measure of 
performance in previous hospital research (e.g., Phillips, 
1999; Sear, 1992; Thomas, 1997) and is often seen as an
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important measure of both treatment quality and efficiency. 
Typically, hospitals with low lengths of stay are 
considered to be efficient in their use of resources 
whereas hospitals with higher lengths of stay are presumed 
to be less efficient (Thomas, 1997). Moreover, hospitals 
with low lengths of stay have been found to be more 
profitable than hospitals with high lengths of stay 
(Langland-Orban et al., 1996). Clinical studies in areas 
such as cardiac surgery (e.g., Moore, 2000), orthopedic 
surgery (e.g., Todara & Schott-Baer, 2000), and psychiatry 
(e.g., Tucker & Brems, 1993), to name but a few, have used 
length of stay as a measure of treatment quality and 
efficiency. Length of stay is calculated by dividing the 
total number of patient days by the total number of 
discharges (OSHPD, 1997).
Return on Assets
Return on assets is being selected as a financial 
indicator of organizations' performance because it is the 
most pervasive measure of organizational firm performance 
for strategy studies examining firm performance 
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 198 6). Return on assets (ROA) is 
a measure of organizational performance that is widely used 
in strategic management (e.g., Brush, Bromiley, & Hendirck, 
1999; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Rumelt,
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1991; Schmalensee, 1985), strategic HR research (e.g., 
Gerhart & Mikovich, 1990), and hospital research (e.g., 
Gardner et al., 1996; Ginn, Young, & Beekun, 1995, 
Langland-Orban, 1996). Prior research suggests that ROA is 
likely to reflect the degree to which cost-benefit 
considerations of HR programs influence organizations' 
achievement of their economic goals (Gardiner, Oswald, & 
Jahera, 1996; Ginn et al., 1995; Sear, 1991). ROA reflects 
a hospital's ability to both control its expenses and use 
its assets to generate income (Lagland-Orban et al, 1996). 
Return on assets is calculated as net gain from operations 
and interest income divided by total current assets and the 
value of plant, property, and equipment (OSHPD, 1998).
Control Variables
Consistent with earlier research hospital ownership, 
size, and profit status will be controlled for in this 
research (Goes & Park, 1997).
Ownership
Ownership considers whether a hospital is privately or 
publicly owned. Private or public ownership may influence 
the hospitals' values for the dependent variables (Eennell 
& Alexander, 1987; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991, Sear, 1991) . 
For example, because indigent patients account for a 
greater proportion of the care given in public hospitals,
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these organizations' efficiency and profits may be 
adversely influenced (Goes & Park, 1997). Efficiency is 
lessened because indigent patients are more likely to be 
acutely ill because they forgo treatment until seriously in 
need (Billings, Zeitel, Lukomnik, & Carey, 1993). 
Consequently, when they receive treatment they are sicker 
and require greater care than non indigent patients 
(Billings et al., 1993). Furthermore, because public 
hospitals treat more indigent patients, their financial 
performance will be lower than privately owned facilities 
where greater revenues are received for services rendered 
(Gardiner et al., 1996; Phillips, 1999).
Hospital Size
Hospital size may also explain differences in the 
dependent variables (Beekun et al., 1998; Gardiner et al., 
1996; Leiyu, 1996; Sear, 1992). Gardiner et al.(1996) 
observe that "organizational theory would suggest that 
hospital size and sophistication of services have a 
positive relationship with performance" (p.443). 
Furthermore, in a study of U.S. hospitals, Beekun et al. 
(1998) note that size is a well established indicator of an 
organization's financial and managerial resources. Larger 
hospitals outperform smaller hospitals because they can 
take advantage of scale economies associated with their
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size (Freeh & Mobley, 1995). Hospital size may further 
influence organizational performance because larger 
hospitals may be more innovative (Goes & Park, 1997). 
Examples of hospital innovation include the timely 
introduction of new technologies (e.g., laser surgery, 
fiberoptic endoscopy, magnetic resonance imaging) and 
administrative services (e.g., home hospice care, in-house 
and freestanding ambulatory surgery centers, adult daycare 
health centers) advances (Goes & Park, 1997). The size 
measure that will be used as a control variable is staffed 
beds, which is a common measure of hospital size (Leiyu,
1996).
Profit Status
Profit and non-profit status may also affect 
differences among the hospitals on the dependent variables 
(Phillips, 1999; Sear, 1992; Sear, 1991). For instance, 
Sear (1991) in a study of Florida hospitals, found that 
for-profit hospitals were both more efficient and more 
profitable than not for-profit hospitals. Even though 
industry-wide competitive and regulatory pressures have 
brought about a convergence of profit and non-profit 
hospitals' goals, differences in profit and non-profit 
hospitals still remain which may influence their 
performance (Beekun et al., 1998; Phillips, 1999). For
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example, Ginn et al. (1995) observe that hospitals' 
financial structures may differ depending upon their profit 
status. One illustration of the potential impact of this is 
that while for-profit hospitals can issue stock to raise 
additional funds, non-profit hospitals cannot (Ginn et al., 
1995). Another explanation for performance differences 
between profit and non-profit hospitals is that non-profit 
hospitals may be less innovative than for profit hospitals 
(Goes & Park, 1997). Innovation may be an important source 
of competitive advantage for investor owned hospitals 
because possessing the latest technologies and services may 
bring greater status and legitimacy to these institutions 
(Goes & Park, 1997).
Statistical Analysis Technique 
Several statistical techniques are potentially useful 
in evaluating pooled longitudinal cross sectional data. 
These include ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, 
least squares dummy variable (LSDV) models, and random 
effects panel data techniques. OLS regression has been 
chosen as the primary means of analysis. OLS is being used 
because it addresses the overall effects of each of the 
compensation practices being considered. Specifically, OLS 
is the most appropriate technique for hierarchically 
investigating the effect of particular independent
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variables, although other techniques have characteristics 
that make them superior to OLS regression in certain 
circumstances (Sayrs, 1989). The next paragraphs discuss 
the benefits and limitations of each technique and present 
the rationale for performing further LSDV analyses in 
addition to the primary OLS analyses.
LSDV models use dummy variables to represent 
unobserved firm specific effects among cross-sectional 
units (Hsiao, 1986). Specifically, LSDV models capture 
differences across cross-sections with a dummy variable 
defined intercept for each cross-section (Maddala, 1987; 
Sayrs, 1989). In comparison to OLS regression, LSDV models 
have the unique advantage of being able to control for 
unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity across firms by 
allowing the intercept of the testing model to vary for 
each firm (Gimeno & Woo, 1996). Thus, LSDV models are 
potentially superior to standard constant coefficient OLS 
regression models because constant coefficient models do 
not adequately allow for differences across cross sectional 
units (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lutkepohl, & Lee, 1985) .
When cross sections are pooled using constant coefficient 
models, unobservable cross-sectional unit heterogeneity 
effects are placed in the disturbance term with variance 
due to other unmeasured effects (Conyon & Peck, 1998). The
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presence of these effects in the disturbance term may lead 
to substantial heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term 
(Sayrs, 1989) . The effects of heteroscedasticity in the 
disturbance term are compounded by the pooling of data 
which, while increasing sample size, also increases the 
contribution of firm heterogeneity to the disturbance term 
(Sayrs, 1989). Consequences of increased firm heterogeneity 
in the disturbance term include the generation of 
inefficient and potentially meaningless regression 
coefficients (Conyon & Peck, 1998; Murphy, 1985; Sayrs, 
1989). Specifically, because heteroscedasticity increases 
error variances, it reduces the power of significance tests 
(Bobko, 1995) .
The primary disadvantage of LSDV, though, is that it 
requires substantial sample sizes. Specifically, to capture 
firm specific effects, LSDV analyses use dummy variables 
unique to each firm in a pool. These dummy variables 
require substantial degrees of freedom (Maddala, 1987). 
Furthermore, another limitation of LSDV is that it is 
impossible to separate the effects of factors which remain 
constant over time from the dummy variables (Judge et al., 
1985). In this research, it is unclear how extensively 
compensation practices change over time. Thus, if firms' 
compensation practices remain constant over time their true
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effects may be difficult to appraise in LSDV analyses. 
Moreover, under these circumstances, it is possible that 
many of the effects attributable to compensation practices 
may be subsumed by the dummy variables in LSDV models 
(Maddala, 1987).
Fixed effects LSDV models also presume that 
differences between firms are fixed as opposed to random in 
nature. A fixed effects approach is appropriate when 
inferences will apply only to cross sectional units in a 
sample (Huselid & Becker, 1996). Random effects are more 
appropriate when inferences will extend to observations 
outside the sample (Huselid & Becker, 1996; Maddala, 1987). 
Thus, initially, a random effects approach seems useful in 
this research. However, random effects models should not be 
used when differences captured by dummy variables in a 
fixed effects model are likely due to characteristics of 
the firms rather than random variation among the firms 
(Judge et al., 1985). Hausman tests are used to evaluate 
the applicability of the random effects approach (Hausman, 
1978). Specifically, Hausman tests evaluate the degree to 
which firm effects are likely correlated with variables 
under consideration and the extent to which this is likely 
to influence the results of random effects models (Hausman, 
1978) . Hausman tests performed in the process of this
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research indicated that fixed effects were more appropriate 
than random effects. Given both the nature of the present 
sample (i.e., the possibility that the firm dummy variables 
were likely some function of unmeasured hospital 
characteristics), and the results of the Hausman tests, the 
fixed effects approach is preferable to the random effects 
approach in evaluating this dissertation's research 
questions (Huselid & Becker 1995). Therefore, in addition 
to the primary OLS regressions, secondary LSDV analyses 
have also been performed.
Procedure
Pooled longitudinal cross sections composed of an 
unbalanced panel data sample of 394 California hospitals 
were used to test the hypotheses. All variables were 
investigated for potential outlying values (Orr, Sackett, & 
Dubois, 1991). Initially, using scatter plots of the data, 
values many standard deviations from the mean were visually 
eliminated (Netar et al., 1989). Following this, remaining 
values greater than three standard deviations from the mean 
of the remaining data were also eliminated. Approximately 
eight percent of the data was excluded due to outlying 
values. A qualitative review of these cases seemed to 
indicate that they may have been mis-codings or
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inappropriate classifications (i.e., not acute care), and 
so were eliminated to ensure an accurate sample.
To investigate causality, compensate for effect lags, 
and consider policy implications all hypothesis were tested 
using dependent variables at time (t) one time period after 
independent variables at time {t—1)(Cook & Campbell, 1979; 
Huselid & Becker, 1996; Kerlinger, 1986; Rogers & Wright, 
1999). A lag of one year has been used in previous research 
investigating the performance implications of compensation 
practices (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). Dynamic models 
(i.e., models with lagged dependent variables) were not 
employed because dependent variables were expected to be 
influenced by values of the independent variables in prior 
periods (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990).
Two hierarchical OLS regression models and two LSDV 
models were estimated to test the hypotheses. The first 
model of each type was used to test hypothesis 1, 
hypothesis 3, and hypothesis 5. The dependent variable for 
these models was the ALOS operational measure of 
organizational performance. The independent variable of 
interest for hypothesis 1 was the relative wage strategy 
measure. The independent variable of interest for 
hypothesis 3 was the curvilinear pay dispersion term (i.e., 
the gini coefficient squared). The independent variable of
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interest for hypothesis 5 was the relative wage level pay 
dispersion interaction term (i.e., relative wage level 
times gini coefficient). The second model of each type 
estimated was used to test hypothesis 2, hypothesis 4, and 
hypothesis 6. The dependent variable for these models was 
the ROA financial measure of organizational performance.
The independent variable of interest for hypothesis 2 was 
the curvilinear relative wage strategy term (i.e., relative 
wage strategy squared). The independent variable of 
interest for hypothesis 4 was the curvilinear pay 
dispersion term (i.e., gini coefficient squared). The 
independent variable of interest for hypothesis 6 was the 
relative wage level pay dispersion interaction term (i.e., 
relative wage level times gini coefficient).
The variables of hospital size, hospital ownership, 
and hospital profit status were controlled for in all 
models. Additionally, a dummy variable for each of the 
longitudinal years of data was included to control for 
unobserved year effects by comparing each year to the base 
year 1996. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and 
correlations for all study variables.
Variables were entered into OLS models hierarchically 
following a procedure established by Cortina(1993) for the 
simultaneous investigation of interactions and curvilinear
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients
Mean SD 2 3 4 5
1. Hospital Size 178.75 130.05 .31*** .07** . 11*** . 07**
2. Organizational Relative 
Wage Strategy
0.01 0.15 -.22*** -0. 01 -.17***
3. Organizational Gini Coefficient 0.22 0.03 . 05* 1***
4. Return on Assets 6.06 12.87 -0.03
5. Average Length of Stay 5.72 2 . 78
N= 2026 
*p < .05 
**p < .01
***p < .001
cr»
relations. In the first step, the time dummy and control 
variables were entered into the models. Next, the relative 
wage level and pay dispersion main effects were entered. 
Following this, the relative wage level and pay dispersion 
quadratic terms were entered into the models. Lastly, the 
pay dispersion relative wage level interaction term was 
entered into the models. All variables were entered into 
LSDV models simultaneously since LSDV analysis in general, 
and hierarchical LSDV analysis in particular, will be 
ineffective if variables are time invariant (Judge et al., 
1985; Maddala, 1987). In this research, the degree to which 
the compensation practices under consideration are time 
invariant is unclear.
Models were investigated for potential violations of 
relevant assumptions including heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Maddala, 1987; Sayrs, 1989). 
Heteroscedasticity is likely present in the OLS models due 
to the effects of cross sectional pooling (Sayrs, 1989). 
Secondary LSDV analyses specifically address this 
heteroscedasticity by introducing firm effects (Sayrs, 
1989). However, in these analyses (i.e., LSDV), plots of 
residuals versus predicted values when ALOS was the 
dependent variable reveled non-constant error variances as 
predicted values of this variable increased (Kvanli,
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Guynes, & Pavur, 1989). This heteroscedasticity was 
compensated for by performing a log transformation on ALOS 
(Netar et al., 1989). Thus, a log transformed ALOS variable 
is used throughout this research.
Heteroscedasticity in the OLS models also made tests 
of autocorrelation using the generally accepted Durbin 
Watson tests inappropriate (Sayrs, 1989). Specifically, 
Durbin Watson auto correlation tests presuppose 
homoscedasticity rather than heteroscedasticity (Sayrs,
1989). However, to further investigate autocorrelation, 
Durbin Watson statistics are reported for the LSDV models. 
Because Durbin Watson tests with large sample sizes and 
multiple variables require significant computer resources, 
all Durbin Watson statistics for organizational level 
models were evaluated using a baseline Durbin Watson dL 
value of 1.98 for N=2026 with 400 variables at a pc.OOl 
significance level (Savin and White, 1977). Based on this 
value, all models demonstrated appropriate Durbin Watson 
values. Thus, this suggests the effects of autocorrelation 
were minimal.
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CHASTER FOUR: RESULTS
Hypothesis 1
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS models for 
hypothesis 1. Table 4 presents the results for the LSDV 
analysis for hypothesis 1. Both analyses lend support to 
hypothesis 1 which predicted that relative wage levels will 
be positively related to operational indicators of 
performance. Importantly, the OLS analysis demonstrates the 
potential impact of compensation practices on operational 
indicators of organizational performance in that relative 
wage practices and pay structures are found to explain over 
4% of the variance in ALOS.
In both analyses, the relation between the 
organizational relative wage level measure and the 
transformed operational measures of organizational 
performance, ALOS, is significant and in the hypothesized 
direction. Lower ALOS is indicative of increased 
organizational performance. Thus, a negative relation 
between the relative wage level measure and ALOS supports 
hypothesis 1. However, because the models used for analyses 
also include an interaction effect between relative wage 
practices and pay structures, relative wage practice main 
effects can not be accurately interpreted (Aiken & West,
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Table 3
Summary of Results for the Hierarchical OLS Regression between 
Organizations' Relative Wage Strategies. Pav Dispersion, the Relative 
Wage Strategy Pay Dispersion Interaction, and 
Average Length of Stay
Step One Step Two Step Three Step Four
Step One Profit Status . 048 • • . 04 3 • . 034 . 036
Ownership , 1 6 ' » " . 1 4 " " . 11 •••■ 12*•••
Size 10.... 2l*«*« . 2 4 " * . 24*•••
Step Two Gini Coefficient .062"* . 065** .075""■•
Overall Relative Wage Strategy • . 13**** -.15*••* - . 1 5 " "
Step Three Gini Coefficient Squared . 0006 • .02
Overall Relative Wage Strategy Squared . 14*"*" . 1 1 " "
Step Pour Relative Wage strategy * Pay Dispersion -.093••••
Overall R Squared 0 07 0.09 0.11 0.12
Change in R Squared 0 . 07 0.02 0.02 0.01
Adjusted R Squared 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.11
F-value of Model 1B.6890***- 20.3394**** 20.44 06 *••• 20.3176-***
N 2026 2026 2026 2026
Mote: Standardized regression coefficients are shown. 
Model Includes a time effect which is not shown.
•fi < . i
•*B < .05
• ■ *p * .01
••••p < .001
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Table 4
Summary of LSDV Analysis for the Relation between 
Organizations' Relative Wage Strategies. Pay Dispersion, 
the Relative Wage Strategy Pav Dispersion Interaction, 
and Indicators of Organizational Performance
Dependent Variable Average Length of Stay Return on Assets
Independent Variable Std. Beta Std. Beta
Organizational Profit Status .061* - .13
Control Variables
Ownership .056 - .23**
Size .103** .097
Pay Policy Relative Wage Level -.12**** -.035*
Variables
Qini .016 .025
Pay Policy Relative Wage Level Squared .0014 . 0093
Curvilinear Terms
Gini Coefficient Squared -.029** -.052**
Interaction Relative Wage * Pay Dispersion -.032** .050*
Overall R squared 0.91 0.53
Adjusted R squared 0.89 0.41
F-value of model 42.9452**** 4.5535****
Hausman test 50.52**** 25.63**
Durbin Watson 1.762**** 1.9666****
N 2026 2026
Not-e. P-value - 12.7258**** for inclusion of firm effect in model where Average Length of Stay is the dependent variable. 
P-value - 4.4133**** for inclusion of firm effect in model where Return on Assets is the dependent variable.
Standardized regression coefficients are shown.
Models include both firm and time effects which are not shown.
*p < . 1
**p < .05
• **p < .01
****p < .001
1991). I will thus interpret this finding below after 
discussing the results for H5.
Hypothesis 2
Table 5 presents the results of the OLS models for 
hypothesis 2. Table 4 presents the results for the LSDV 
analysis for hypothesis 2. Statistical results find little 
support for hypothesis 2, which predicted that there would 
be an inverted U shaped relation between organizations' 
overall relative wage strategies and the ROA financial 
measure of organizational performance. In the OLS analysis, 
the relation between the relative wage quadratic term and 
ROA was in the hypothesized direction but not significant. 
However, in the LSDV analyses the relation between the 
relative wage quadratic term and ROA was not in the 
hypothesized direction or significant.
Hypothesis 3
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS model for 
hypothesis 3. Table 4 presents the results of the LSDV 
analysis for hypothesis 3. Statistical results yield little 
support for hypothesis 3, which predicted that there would 
be an inverted U shaped relation between organizational 
measures of pay dispersion and operational measures of 
organizational performance. OLS results were opposite the 
hypothesized direction and not significant while LSDV
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Table 5
Summary of Results for the Hierarchical 
OLS Regression between Organizations' Relative 
Wage Strategies. Pay Dispersion, the Relative Wage Strategy 
Pav Dispersion Interaction, and Return on Assets
S t e p  O n e  Step T w o  Seep T h r e e  Step Four
S t e p  One Profit S tatus -.0094 - .0099 .0086 - .0097
O w n e r s h i p .097*••• .094•*•• 103*-»* .097*
Size . 13-*** .13**•• .13'*1 * . 13****
S t e p  T w o Gini Coef f i c i e n t .033 . 030* .029
O ver a l l  R e l a t i v e  W a g e  St r a t e g y - . 020 - . 012 -.012
St e p  Three G i n i  Coef f i c i e n t  Squa r e d - .032 -.011
Overall R e l a t i v e  Wage S t r a t e g y  Squ a r e d - .024 -.0032
S t e p  Pour Re l a t i v e  W a g e  S t r a t e g y  * Pay D i s p e r s i o n . 009* *•*
Overall R Squa r e d 0.02 0.03
r»1 
OO
0.03
Ch a n g e  in R Squared 0.02 0 . 01 0.00 0.00
Ad j u s t e d  R  Squared 0.02 0.02 0.02
OO
P - v a l u e  of Model S.0630**** 5 . 0596* * * * 4 . 5162**** 5 .2693 *•* *
N 2026 2026 2026 2026
Hotei S t a n d a r d i z e d  r e g r ession co e f f i c i e n t s  a re shown. 
Mod e l  includes a time effect w h i c h  is not shown.
*p < .1
•*p < .05
* * * p  < .01
• • ••p < .001
results were significant but opposite the hypothesized 
direction.
Hypothesis 4
Table 5 presents the results of the OLS models for 
hypothesis 4. Table 4 presents the results for the LSDV 
analysis for hypothesis 4. Study results yield partial 
support for hypothesis 4, which predicted that there would 
be an inverted (J shaped relation between pay dispersion and 
financial indicators of organizational performance. Results 
of the OLS regression, while in the hypothesized direction, 
were not significant. However, in the LSDV analyses, the 
relation between the pay dispersion quadratic term and ROA 
was in the hypothesized direction and significant.
Hypothesis 5
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS models for 
hypothesis 5. Table 4 presents the results of the LSDV 
analysis for hypothesis 5. Both the OLS and the LSDV 
results support hypothesis 5, which predicted that 
organizations' relative wage strategies would interact with 
their degree of pay dispersion to influence ALOS. 
Specifically, high relative wages were hypothesized to 
positively influence the relation between pay dispersion 
and ALOS.
54
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Figure 1 plots the relation between relative wage 
practices and ALOS for high and low levels of pay 
dispersion. Figure 1 indicates that for each of these 
levels of pay dispersion, as relative wage levels increase, 
ALOS is generally positively affected. Thus, in addition to 
lending support to hypothesis 5, these results also provide 
graphical support for hypothesis 1.
Figure 2 portrays the interaction between 
organizations' relative wage strategies and their degrees 
of pay dispersion and its effect on ALOS. The nature of 
the interaction is determined by plotting separate lines 
for high, low, and average relative wage levels. Low 
relative wages are represented by a lag relative wage 
strategy one standard deviation below the mean relative 
wage level. High relative wages are represented by a lead 
relative wage strategy one standard deviation above the 
mean relative wage level. Average relative wages are 
represented by a match relative wage strategy equal to the 
mean relative wage level. Figure 2 indicates that when 
relative wages are high, pay dispersion positively 
influences ALOS whereas, when relative wages are low, pay 
dispersion negatively influences ALOS.
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Hypothesis 6
Table 5 presents the results of the OLS model for 
hypothesis 6. Table 4 presents the results of the LSDV 
analysis for hypothesis 6. Both OLS and LSDV analyses 
support hypothesis 6, which predicted that organizations' 
relative wage strategies would interact with their degrees 
of pay dispersion to influence ROA. Specifically, high 
relative wages were hypothesized to positively influence 
the relation between pay dispersion and ROA. Figure 3 plots 
the relation between relative wage practices and ROA for 
high and low levels of pay dispersion. Figure 3 
demonstrates the hypothesized interaction between 
organizations' relative wage strategies and organizations' 
degrees of pay dispersion. Figure 4 portrays the effect of 
the interaction between organizations' relative wage 
strategies and organizations' degrees of pay dispersion on 
the relation between pay dispersion and ROA. Again, the 
nature of the interaction is determined by plotting 
separate lines for the relation between pay dispersion and 
ROA for low, high, and average relative wage levels. Figure 
4 indicates that when relative wages are high, pay 
dispersion positively influences ROA whereas, when relative 
wages are low, pay dispersion negatively influences ROA.
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Table 6 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Results
Hypothesis Relationship Result
1 Organizations' relative wage levels will be 
positively related to operational indicators 
of organizational performance.
Supported
2 An inverted U-shaped relation exists between 
organizational level relative wage strategies 
and financial indicators of organizational 
performance.
Not Supported
3 An inverted U-shaped relation exists between 
pay structures level of dispersion and 
operational indicators of organizational 
performance.
Not Supported
4 An inverted U-shaped relation exists between 
pay structures level of dispersion and 
financial indicators of organizational 
performance.
Not Supported
5 The positive effects of relative wage strategies 
on operational indicators of organizational 
performance will be generated under a hierarchical 
pay structure rather than an egalitarian 
pay structure.
Supported
6 The positive effects of relative wage strategies 
on financial indicators of organizational 
performance will be generated under a hierarchical 
pay structure rather than an egalitarian 
pay structure.
Supported
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
Answers to Research Questions 
This dissertation has sought to investigate the 
organizational performance implications of pay structures 
and relative wage rates. Specifically, it has focused on 
these implications in terms of operational and financial 
indicators of organizational performance. Statistical 
results suggest that relative wage practices and pay 
structures influence organizational performance in these 
areas. Perhaps most noteworthy, results indicate that 
relative wage practices and pay structures interact to 
affect these areas of organizational performance.
As suggested by hypothesis 1, the relation between 
relative wage practices and operational measures of 
performance appears to be positive as hypothesized. This 
result must be interpreted cautiously since main effects 
may be misleading in models with interactive effects (Aiken 
& West, 1991). However, the previous caveat not 
withstanding, plots of the data generally indicate that 
relative wage practices have a positive effect on 
operational measures of organizational performance. Thus, 
lending support to hypothesis 1, a positive relation 
appears to exist between organizations' relative wage 
practices and ALOS. Although there are curvilinear and
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interactive effects whose influence must be considered, 
hospitals which pay above average relative wages do seem to 
have shorter patient lengths of stay (ALOS) than hospitals 
with lower pay levels.
Limited statistical results for hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 
suggests that the actual relations may be other than those 
hypothesized. One scenario is that, as proposed by 
hypotheses 5 and 6, relative wage levels and pay dispersion 
may interact to influence the relations hypothesized. 
Importantly, Cortina (1993) has observed that curvilinear 
and interaction effects are both very similar and easily 
confused. Moreover, Cortina (1993) suggests the importance 
of simultaneously investigating both curvilinear and 
interaction effects. Thus, incongruent results for these 
hypotheses (i.e., hypotheses 2, 3, and 4) may be due to 
interactive effects such as those proposed by hypotheses 5 
and 6 (i.e., an interaction between relative wage levels 
and pay dispersion). Indeed, as Bedeian and Mossholder 
(1994) point out, "a significant interaction term suggests 
that two or more lines fit the data better than a single 
regression line." (P.162) This is illustrated by figures 1, 
2, 3, and 4. Specifically, these figures demonstrate that 
the nature of the relevant curvilinear relations depends 
upon the level of the compensation practice which is not
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being directly investigated. Thus, the findings associated 
with hypotheses 5 and 6 must be discussed as a potential 
explanation for hypotheses 2, 3, and 4's mixed results.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 investigated the interaction 
between relative wage levels and pay dispersion and its 
effect on the relation between pay dispersion and ALOS 
(hypothesis 5) and ROA (hypothesis 6). Hypotheses 5 and 6 
were supported in both the OLS and the LSDV analyses. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 represent simultaneous investigations of 
the impact of relative wage levels and pay structures. 
Support for these hypotheses asserts the importance of 
concurrently considering relative wage strategy and pay 
structure decisions. In fact, the interactions most 
probably explain the mixed results for the previous 
hypotheses. Thus, relative wage strategies, it seems, do 
influence the organizational performance effects of pay 
structure decisions. Results suggest that high relative 
wages are preferable when pay dispersion is high, while low 
relative wages are preferable when pay dispersion is low. 
Moreover, if given a choice, it seems organizations should 
pursue a strategy of either high relative wages and 
hierarchical pay structure or low relative wages and 
egalitarian pay structures. As illustrated in figures 2 and 
4, these relative wage strategy/pay structure combinations
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generally appear tc most positively affect organizational 
performance.
Findings that high relative wages and hierarchical pay 
structures positively affect organizations' performance are 
consistent with observations by Bloom and Michael (in 
press) that high relative wages potentially lessen the 
negative effects of hierarchical pay structures. 
Specifically, Bloom and Michael (in press) propose that 
high relative wages limit hierarchical pay structures' 
adverse effects on employees' cooperation and coordination. 
Moreover, they suggest employees will tolerate significant 
pay dispersion so long as they receive wages that exceed 
their marginal products (Bloom & Michael, in press; Frank, 
1985) . Thus, while hierarchical pay distributions may 
decrease employees' coordination and cooperation, the 
simultaneous application of high relative wages appears to 
counteract these effects.
Results also indicate that a combination of low 
relative wages and egalitarian pay structures may 
positively affect organizations' performance. Deci's (1975) 
work on intrinsic motivation may be useful in interpreting 
this finding. Specifically, as previously proposed, 
egalitarian structures (i.e., under those circumstances 
where significant differences exist in skill requirements
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across job categories) and low relative wages are expected 
to be ineffective compensation practices. Moreover, because 
low relative wages and egalitarian structures are 
potentially ineffective compensation practices, employees 
in organizations with these characteristics (i.e. low 
relative wages and egalitarian pay structures) must be 
influenced by these compensation practices differently than 
hypothesized. One explanation is that these compensation 
practices have characteristics that are supportive of 
employees' intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is a 
particularly relevant explanation because, like egalitarian 
pay structures, it is often discussed in the context of 
environments which require coordination and cooperation.
The concept of participative management is useful to 
illustrate this. Specifically, participative management 
concepts are recognized both for the employee coordination 
and cooperation they require, as well as for their 
contributions to employees' intrinsic motivation (Deci,
1975). Thus, to the extent that egalitarian pay structures 
create an environment of employee cooperation and 
coordination they foster intrinsic motivation.
Furthermore, research has found that intrinsic motivation 
decreases when employees are paid high relative wages for 
instrumental reasons such as those proposed by efficiency
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wage.theory (Deci, 1975). Therefore, while egalitarian pay 
structures may foster an environment in which intrinsic 
motivation is maximized, intrinsic motivation is 
simultaneously lessened if employees are paid high relative 
wages for purely instrumental purposes. Thus, egalitarian 
pay structures, while useful in fostering intrinsic 
motivation when relative wages are low, are ineffective in 
fostering intrinsic motivation when relative wages are 
high. This potentially explains why egalitarian pay 
structures and low relative wage levels positively 
influence organizational performance.
Hospital size appears to be one characteristic that 
distinguishes hospitals that pursue combinations of either 
high relative wages and hierarchical pay distributions or 
low relative wages and egalitarian pay distributions. 
Indeed, based on a visual review of the data, larger 
hospitals appear to more frequently use the combination of 
high relative wages and hierarchical pay distributions 
whereas, smaller hospitals seem to more frequently use the 
combination of low relative wages and egalitarian pay 
structures. While the potential interpretations of this 
finding are numerous, one explanation is that it represents 
some shared understanding among particular size hospitals 
of optimal compensation practices (i.e., relative wage
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practices and pay structures). Moreover, it could reflect 
the process whereby firms identify and mimic other firms' 
sources of competitive advantage (Wright et al., 1994). 
Thus, it may suggest that hospitals recognize particular 
combinations of relative wage levels and pay distributions 
as sources of HRM based competitive advantage (Wright et 
al., 1994) .
Limitations
Limitations of this research include generalizability 
issues associated with both the sample and the method of 
calculating organizational pay dispersion. A sample of 
hospitals is undoubtably a unique sample. Differences 
between hospitals and other organizations include that 
hospitals are highly labor intensive organizations 
(Langland-Orban et al., 1996). Furthermore, due to recent 
financial constraints in hospitals which have yielded a 
less skilled mix of employees than in past, many employees 
important to a hospital's success are now located at lower 
organizational levels (Langland-Orban et al., 1996). This 
likely made the dissertation's dependent variables more 
susceptible to the effect of relative wage practices and 
pay dispersion at lower organizational levels.
Another of the dissertation's limitations is the 
technique whereby organizational pay dispersion was
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approximated. Optimally, a pay dispersion measure would 
consider all of an organization's employees. Regrettably, 
the realities of data collection make getting this type of 
data from a sizable enough sample of organizations nearly 
impossible. Thus, this dissertation has used 
organizations' average wage values for hierarchically 
unequal job categories in calculating pay dispersion. 
Moreover, job categories are based upon employee skill 
requirements for each job category. While this is a 
potentially meaningful way of viewing hierarchies of 
organizational members, it may not be applicable to all 
organizations. Specifically, some hierarchies may be better 
conceptualized based upon authority rather than skill 
differences. Thus, the results of this dissertation may be 
more appropriate to those situations where hierarchies of 
organizational members are best viewed based upon skill 
rather than authority differences.
Calculating pay dispersion with job category level 
data also neglects differences in pay that occur within 
particular job categories. Thus, any differences in pay 
within specific job categories are excluded. Consequently, 
pay dispersion, as considered in this dissertation, does 
not capture the potentially significant dispersion which 
occurs within various job categories. While pay dispersion
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between job categories is important in its own right, pay 
dispersion within job categories may be both meaningful and 
significant. Pay dispersion within job categories is 
particularly relevant in light of the potential costs and 
difficulties (e.g., differences in skill requirements 
across job categories in some organizations) associated 
with moving between job categories. Were it possible to 
include this within job category pay dispersion different 
theories might be tested. Most notably, the precepts of 
tournament theory might be applicable as employees would be 
able to compete against each other within a job type for 
pay increases.
Directions for Future Research 
Areas for future research include further 
consideration of the effects of relative wage levels and 
pay dispersion on organizational performance in different 
settings with other measures. Specifically, future research 
which alleviates the limitations of the current research 
setting and pay dispersion measures would be beneficial.
For instance, it might be valuable to investigate pay 
dispersion in settings where the importance of employee 
cooperation varies. Negative organizational effects of 
hierarchical pay distributions occur because increased pay 
dispersion adversely affects employees' cooperativeness.
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Thus, the negative effects of hierarchical pay 
distributions may depend upon the level of cooperation 
necessary in a particular setting. Research could also 
investigate the micro level influences of employees' 
cooperativeness on the organizational effectiveness of 
particular pay structures. Moreover, research could also 
consider the impact of particular levels of pay dispersion 
on employee job attitudes. Finally, opportunities where pay 
dispersion could be calculated using all employees might be 
valuable in further investigating the organizational 
performance effects of pay dispersion.
Consideration of the organizational performance 
effects of relative wage strategies and pay structures in 
international settings might also prove a useful area for 
future research. The United States is among the most 
individualistic of all societies. Research suggests that 
human resource practices which work in individualistic 
societies may be less effective in more collective society 
(Hofstede, 1984). Specifically, compensation practices 
which directly reward individual performance and 
achievement may be offensive to members of collective 
societies. This is particularly the case when these 
collectivistic societies value more paternalistic factors 
such as employee tenure or overall group harmony in
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determining individual compensation (Beatty, McCune,& 
Beatty, 1988) . Thus, one area for future research would be 
to evaluate the effectiveness of relative wage strategies 
and pay structures depending upon a country's level of 
individualism.
Another valuable area for future research may be 
consideration of the organizational performance impact of 
other strategic human resource management practices. 
Investigations of the impact of strategic practices in the 
areas of staffing and training might further elucidate the 
organizational effect of strategic human resource 
management practices. Particularly useful would be 
consideration of the coordination between these practices 
and compensation practices, and the effect of this 
coordination on organizational performance (MacDuffie,
1995). Also useful would be consideration of the 
performance implications of strategic human resource 
management practices fit with the overall strategy of the 
organization.
Conclusion
In sum, this research makes an important step in 
describing how compensation practices are related to 
organizations' operational and financial performance. 
However, we are far from understanding how the whole of HRM
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impacts organizations' performance. Thus, research into the 
organizational performance effects of compensation and 
other HRM practices must continue.
The California Office of Statewide Health Planning and 
Development deserves credit for making available 
information that allows researchers to examine HR 
practices' effects over many organizations and many years. 
Hopefully, more such data opportunities will be made 
available, and research will take advantage of such 
opportunities to advance the field's understanding of how 
HRM impacts the strategic functions of organizations.
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